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The reflective paradigm in educational research has been mainly inspired by two
parallel approaches: a pragmatist approach-developed on the basis of Dewey’s idea
or reflective thinking and Schön’s notion of reflection in action-as well as on an ap-
proach inspired to Critical Theory, with particular attention to the work of Haber-
mas and his analysis of the relationship between knowledge and interest. The two
approaches have been often contrasted and not explored within a continuum which
has determined an empasse in the exploration of educational agency. In order to
overcome this empasse, it is useful to refer to a perspective internal to educational
practices, aimed at highlighting their complex phenomenology. This leads us in
identifying the different forms of intentionality as well as the structural dynamics
that shape educational practices as specific forms of social agency inscribed within
educational systems, and explored focusing on the forms of relexivity imbedded
within those systems. 
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Il paradigma riflessivo nella ricerca educativa è stato ispirato sostanzialmente da
due approcci paralleli: un approccio pragmatista, sviluppato sulla base della idea
deweyana di pensiero riflessivo e della nozione di riflessione nel corso dell’azione
elaborata da Schön ed un approccio ispirato alla Teoria Critica, con particolare
attenzione al pensiero di Habermas ed alla sua analisi della relazione intercorren-
te tra conoscenza ed interesse. I due approcci sono stati frequentemente contrap-
posti e non esplorati all’interno di un continuum, il che ha determinato un em-
passe nell’esplorazione dell’agire educativo. Per superare questo empasse, è utile
fare riferimento ad una prospettiva interna alle pratiche educative finalizzata ad
illuminare la loro complessa fenomenologia. Ciò ci conduce ad identificare le dif-
ferenti forme di intenzionalità insieme alle dinamiche strutturali che danno forma
alle pratiche educative, considerate come peculiari forme di azione sociale inscrit-
te all’interno dei sistemi educativi ed esplorate focalizzandosi sulle forme di rifles-
sività situate all’interno di questi sistemi. 
Parole chiave: riflessione, pensiero riflessivo, riflessività
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1. The reflective paradigm and its dicotomies in contemporary debate
In the last thirty years the reflective paradigm has been a strong reference
in contemporary epistemological debate regarding educational practices
and professionals. 
Within this paradigm, the terms “reflection” and “reflectivity” have
been understood in various different terms, according essentially to two
approaches and perspectives.
According to an approach grounded in the pragmatist tradition, reflec-
tion is essentially a form of thinking which emerges from within human
experience and helps in detecting problematic issues, formulating prob-
lems, identifying and testing hypothesis, defining outcomes and organiz-
ing funds of knowledge; moreover, this form of thinking leads us to con-
nect previous and further experiences in a continuous chain, and to iden-
tify further and even long term consequences and outcomes of our actions
and thoughts. 
Reflection or “reflective thinking” as Dewey defines it, is the main tool
that supports scientific inquiry and its structure models a method for the
individual and collective exploration of human experiences; reflective
thinking it is also a tool for ethical inquiry, as it grounds “reflective moral-
ity” which is a “habit of examination and judgment, of keeping the mind
open, sensitive, to the defects and the excellences of the existing social or-
der” and, at the same time,  to “one’s own behavior in relation to the ex-
isting order” (J. Dewey, Ethics, MW.5, 1908, p. 169).
Rodgers has distilled four criteria that characterize Dewey’s notion of
reflection and the purpose he felt it served identifying it as: “ a meaning
making process” that moves us from one experience into the next with
deeper understanding of its relationships with and connections to other
experiences and ideas”; “a means of essentially moral ends”; “ a systematic
rigorous, disciplined way of thinking, with its roots in scientific inquiry”;
a process that “needs to happen in community, in interaction with others”
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and that “requires attitudes that value the personal and intellectual
growth of oneself and of others” (Rodgers, 2002, p. 845). 
Within this framework, reflection is therefore a “transactional” think-
ing process emerging from contextual situations and engaging multiple ac-
tors in a process of joint inquiry which produces new understandings, and
sustains individual and collective agency and practice. 
Along this line, Schön (1993) has explored the implications of the use
of reflective thinking within the context of professional practice in general
and in educational practice in particular, and has highlighted how reflec-
tion is an essential element of professional agency, as it grounds the possi-
bility of making meaning of professional actions while they occur and un-
fold. 
The idea of “reflection in action” helps us in looking at educational
agency as an experiential continuum sustained by a process of exploration
aimed at clarifying and understanding events, occurrances and situations
and at focusing on its own ethical implications, taking into account its ref-
erence to the contexts as well its consequences and outcomes.
This approach has been very influential in contemporary educational
discourse, and has oriented the focus of educational research on the com-
plex and undetermined dimension of educational practices, in order to
identify and sustain the emergence of reflective processes within them,
while not taking into account other kinds of related issues (such as for ex-
ample issues of legitimacy, power, recognition…). 
According to an approach referred to the Critical Theory (and in par-
ticular to Habermas’ analysis of the relationship between knowledge and
interest in scientific inquiry as well to his theory of communicative agency)
reflection is, instead intended as a process sustained by forms of critical
judgement, that help us in identifying the cultural and social implicit and
hidden constrains of any form of social agency, as well as the underlying
practical interests that orient the processes of inquiry and knowledge con-
struction within our practices. 
Habermas’ articulation of the different interests and relative forms or
rationality sustaining the processes of scientific inquiry and knowledge has
guided Van Manen in outlining different levels of reflectivity of delibera-
tive rationality, associated with corresponding interpretations of the prac-
tical within educational contexts. 
Within this framework at a first level the practical is concerned mainly
with means rather than ends; accordingly educators are forced into adopt-
ing an attitude that embraces these principles as the criteria for practical
action but “when the nature of this constraint is recognized, the need for
a higher level of deliberative rationality becomes apparent”; on this sec-
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ond, higher level of reflectivity “it is assumed that every educational
choice is based on a value commitment to some interpretive framework”
and, accordingly, “the practical then refers to the process of analyzing and
clarifying individual and cultural experiences, meanings, perceptions, as-
sumptions, prejudgments, and presuppositions, for the purpose of orient-
ing practical actions” (Van Manen, 1977, p. 226). 
At this level of the practical, the focus is on an interpretive understand-
ing both of the nature and quality of educational experience, and of prac-
tical choices.
Nonetheless, in order to deliberate the worth of educational goals and
experiences, a still higher level of reflective rationality is needed. 
Therefore “It is on this highest level of deliberative rationality that the
practical assumes its classical politico-ethical meaning of social wisdom”
involving “a constant critique of domination, of institutions, and of re-
pressive forms of authority” (ivi, p. 227). 
Gu-Ze’ev, Masschelein & Blake have offered an analysis of the two ap-
proaches above described, contrasting them by using the term ‘reflectivity’
to identify the Deweyan approach which, according to the authors “re-pre-
sents the hegemonic realm of self-evidence and the productive violence of
social and cultural order” and the term “reflection” to identify the critical
theory approach, which “aims to challenge the supposedly self-evident and
the present order of things” (Gu-Ze’ev, Masschelein, Blake, 2001). 
The authors claim that within the framework of what they define “nor-
malizing education” there is no room for reflection, but only for reflectiv-
ity; reflection can therefore occasionally emerge only in contexts and situ-
ations of “counter education”.
If reflectivity, intended according to the pragmatist tradition, as a
process of inquiry (with deep ethical implications) aimed at making mean-
ing of educational experiences is the reference for the definition of a re-
flective epistemology of educational practices, critical reflection is the ma-
trix that shapes emancipatory and transformative processes.
Within this analysis reflectivity could not play any possible role in pro-
moting change from the inside of the educational systems, understood as
“normalizing” structures; moreover, the exercise of reflective thinking, in
the form of “reflective morality” would not have any ethical and moral
outcomes since it is not transcendentally oriented according to a critical
frame of reference.
On the other end, reflection aims at transcendence and represents a
moral commitment in respect of the “otherness of the Other”, which
“power relations in every realm of self-evidence oblige us to neglect, to de-
stroy or consume” […].
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Indeed a radical opposition and separation of the two approaches in
these terms is not useful in understanding the emergence of reflective
processes and practices within the educational contexts according to dif-
ferent interests, motives and needs and to analyse their unfolding, taking
into account the complexity and continuity of educational experiences.
In order to overcome the empasse determined by a dicotomic under-
standing of the two approaches (which should, instead be considered as
referring to two different educational dimensions) an epistemic move is
required, which would position us inside the complex phenomenology of
educational agency and practice.
It is within this context that reflective processes may emerge and un-
fold according to different patterns and can, therefore, be explored and
analysed through a contextual and situational frame of reference, which
will allow us to identify the dimensions that ground and shape them a in
different forms and at different levels. 
Integrating a phenomenological and a structuralist approach, we will
eventually come to an epistemological reframing of the notions of reflectiv-
ity and reflection the basis of an exploration of their generative ground, fo-
cusing on the intentional and structural dimensions of educational agency.
Within this framework, the notion of reflexivity intended as the basic
condition that allows the emergence of reflective processes will finally
help us in highlighting the different the different functions that they per-
form within educational contexts.
2. The complex phenomenology of educational agency and practice
Grounded in what Husserl defines “Lebenswelt” (a world made of inten-
tional acts, objects and contents which always refer to a subjective con-
sciousness), educational agency and practices are, indeed, characterized
by a complex phenomenology, which calls for a pedagogical approach
aimed at highlighting the constitutive referentiality and directedness
imbedded within them, including the pre-cognitive and pre-logical ele-
ments characterizing their background.
In order to have a full understanding and control of their development
and their outcomes we should, therefore, explore the different forms of
intentionality that inspire, motivate and sustain them. 
This requires to engage educational agents in forms of reflexivity that
relate individual and collective consciousness to self consciousness and
create the conditions to explore the intentional elements characterizing
and defining educational agency within a specific context. 
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According to Husserl, intentionality should be analyzed in terms of
three central ideas: intentional acts, intentional objects and intentional
content. 
While the intentional act is the particular kind of mental event (per-
ceiving, believing, evaluating, remembering…) occurring within a specific
situation, the intentional object is what the act is referred to. 
As there are different ways to refer to an object, any correlation occur-
ring among an intentional act and object is framed by an intentional con-
tent which defines the position of the agent, the approach and perspective
used in the engagement with the object, the meaning emerging from the
engagement itself. 
If we analyze educational agency and practices focusing on their phe-
nomenology, we should therefore primarily identify the intentional acts,
objects and contents that form them as a complex whole by directly en-
gaging the different agents implied, through different degrees of con-
sciousness and self-consciousness.
Educational agents are therefore reflexively engaged in the exploration
of their observations, perceptions, representations of educational events,
facts, situations focusing on the ways they frame and understand them,
but also on the cultural and pre-cognitive elements that somehow deter-
mine those intentional contents.
With reference to educational practices an intentional act could be, for
example, defining an educational objective such as “developing self
awareness” (which becomes, indeed an intentional object) and the relative
intentional content is related to what “self awareness” stands within a spe-
cific educational framework (awareness of one’s own emotions and feel-
ings; awareness of one’s own cognitive moves in a metacognitive perspec-
tive; awareness of one’s beliefs and representations, according to a critical
and reflective perspective...) and within a specific cultural and social con-
text. 
In a normalizing context within which education is understood as a
process of inculturation into shared customs, mores and traditions, self
awareness could be understood in terms of self control and self regulation
in order to conform to specific patterns, and this vision would have an im-
pact on the planning and organization of educational actions and practices
in a conformative fashion. 
On the other side, in a context within which education is understood
as a process sustaining individual and collective growth, self awareness
could be understood in terms of self exploration, self-determination and
self-understanding, and this vision would frame educational experiences
and activities according to an inquiring and reflective pattern.
Understandings, representations, visions are the pre-cognitive ele-
ments that ground and frame the different forms of intentionality embed-
ded within educational agency and practices, and should therefore ex-
plored in depth in order to value their influence on educational processes
through various forms of reflection and related forms of rationality.
Moreover, as it is always inscribed within a cultural and social texture,
educational agency should be seen as inherently social, and therefore un-
derstood as a particular form of social agency.
Within this framework, the notion of reflection defined by Bourdieu
could be useful in providing a deeper understanding of the nature and
structure of educational agency.
Bourdieu focuses on the reflective relationship between the social
agent, who acts according to the “logic of practice” performed in the con-
text of habitus, situation, or embodiment and the observer, who is con-
stantly engaged in a process based on the logic of reflection, useful to
highlight the hidden patterns of routinary practices. 
The repetition of experiences and behaviours enables social agents to
progressively gain an inclination to act, to express, or to think in a specific
way, which eventually becomes an habitus. 
This is the primary source of thoughts, perceptions, expressions and
actions, which are always conditioned by the historical and social bases of
their production.
Habitus indeed is the matrix of schemes of perception, as well as the
“generative grammar of practices”, which are therefore performed on the
ground of possessed predispositions, unconsciously operationalized.
All these elements require to be explored in depth in order to gain a
deep understanding of the underlying intentionalities in educational
agency, and here is when reflection comes to the scene allowing the edu-
cational agents to identify the generative elements of their practices and
therefore to modify and revise them.
3. The ecology of educational reflective practice between agency and
structure
In the same line Giddens distinguishes “discursive consciousness” and
“practical consciousness”. 
“Practical consciousness” lies both in the unconscious as well as the
non-conscious knowledge about social rules, which enables social actors
to manage social relationships and engage social actions without reflecting
on their motives and implications.
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Both “discursive consciousness” and “practical consciousness” lead
social actors to the use of “mechanisms of retrospection, which operate in
the settings of action” and keep them “in contact with the fundamental
reasons of their activities” but it’s the actors’ capacity not only to be aware
of, but to reflect on the motives of their own actions and to share them
with the others that paves the way for the emergence of “discursive con-
sciousness”. 
Gidden’s notion of “discursive consciousness” is grounded in a theory
of structuration, which sees social life as an interplay of agency and struc-
ture and is extremely useful in understanding educational practices focu-
sing of the structural elements that constrain them, and on the reflective
role of educational agents, and highlights the situativeness of educational
agency and practices.
This structural approach is extremely useful in identifying the degrees
of structural distance in space and time between the educational practitio-
ners and the professional situation in which they work, and helps us in fra-
ming educational practice focusing on its situatedeness.
According to Giddens structures are “rules and resources” (Giddens,
1979:64) according to which we understand how things should be done
drawing on “authoritative” and “allocative” resources. 
Whereas “autorithative resources” are the roles and functions played
by the different agent in a specific institution, organization or situation,
“allocative resources” are those available in a specific contextual configu-
ration and arranged in order to perform a specific practice.
Structures are organized in form of “mutual knowledge” which is tak-
en for granted knowledge about how to act and which resources make use
of, which persist among diverse groups of people and are lodged in
agents’ heads in ‘memory traces’.
Our practices are organized around those understandings as well as the
capabilities that support those understandings; accordingly, most of edu-
cational practices take place at the level of practical consciousness, where
professionals just act referring to predetermined structures.
Educational institutions are structurally made of practices, which have
become routinized, carried out across time and space by a number of dif-
ferent agents who keep on repeating those practices over and over again.
The structures imbedded in the educational institutions have a double
function: they are the outcomes of the practices which have previously
been performed, and are the ground of further practices to be performed;
a structure only exists in practices and in the memory traces in agents’
practical consciousness, and has no existence external to these.
As structures do not reproduce themselves, it is always agents and their
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practices that reproduce them, depending on specific circumstances and
situations.
Educational agency and practices are therefore to be understood ac-
cording to a situational ecology, through which making visible the com-
plex interplay occurring between agency and structure.
This interplay can be reflectively explored through shared forms of
“discursive consciousness” that offer to educational professionals the op-
portunity to clarify and explore their practices, focusing on the rules they
refer to as well as the resources they have access to and make use of.
Reflection is, therefore, an emerging social function shared between
multiple agents who are engaged in the complex task of organizing and re-
constructing their practices.
Several authors have explored educational agency and practice refer-
ring to Giddens’ structural approach, but few contributes are particularly
interesting for a pedagogical reflection on the role of reflexivity in the ac-
ting of educational professionals focusing both on the individual as well as
on the collective dimension.
Young suggests that teacher education policies should be based on re-
flexive not technocratic processes of modernization (Young, 1998) that
view professional educational processes as opportunities to engage as ac-
tive and reflective agents in a process of continuous revision and recon-
struction of the rules and resources framing educational practices, and not
as processess of engagement into pre-definite structures.
Educational professionals should therefore be engaged end encoura-
ged as reflective agents whose role is not that of reproducing existing
structures (in terms of rules, roles and resource arrangements) but rather
of claryfing their function within educational practices, as well as decon-
structing and reconstructing these practices according to specific situatio-
nal conditions and needs.
Quicke highlights how the reflexive processes require to be carried on
engaging not individual professionals, but professional communities with-
in a “framework that guarantees individual agency as well as community
‘voice’” (Quicke, 1997). 
In this perspective communities of educational professionals are reflec-
tively engaged in discursive activities, which help them in exploring and
sharing the motives and reasons of individual actions and practices, byin-
scribing them within a collective frame of reference aimed at defining and
specifying their impact and relevance within educational systems. 
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4. Reflection and reflexivity within educational systems
Educational practices are always inscribed within educational systems
which, according to Luhmann and Schorr, are characterized by a specific
form of reflexivity.
Luhmann explains how reflexivity is a defining feature of all living,
psychic and social systems, which include self-referential, self-organiza-
tional, autopoetic, autonomous and interdependent boundary-establish-
ing processes.
Reflexivity generates the conditions to generate meaningful (self-)
identities and to frame the spaces of encounter, communication and dis-
course between self-identities as well as within and among the different
systems. 
Within educational systems, reflexivity works as an underlying anthro-
pological structure which sustains learning, knowing and understanding
and is articulated in different functions such as thinking, representing, act-
ing. 
Reflexivity is essential for the self control and self regulation of educa-
tional systems, in order to simplify the increasing levels of complexity that
characterize educational processes.
According to this framework, reflection is to be understood as an ac-
tive force that works out particular and situational cases of reflexivity,
aimed at: exploring the problematic issues emerging from educational
practices and processes; creating connections among different educational
actions; inscribing specific educational situations and experiences within
a systemic frame of reference. 
In this perspective, reflection implies the positioning of an agent (play-
ing a specific role) on a secondary level, in order tomake her/him be able
to look at the educational experiences identifying and specifying the ele-
ments that characterize them.
Educational agents play, therefore, an essential role within educational
systems.
They can be engaged in intersubjective and intrasubjective self-referen-
tial, self-organizational processes aimed at clarifying, defining, specifying
functions, roles, procedures and at identifying problematic issues related
to the identity and function of the systems and of the agents operating
within them.
Moreover, they are called to explore the sense and meaning of the prac-
tices they are engaged in, and to reframe them according to different
meaning perspectives.
Educational systems that can continuously create and re-create them-
184 Pedagogia Oggi / Rivista SIPED / anno XV – n. 2 – 2017
selves on the basis of the capacity of educational agents to think within
and on educational practices and situations, to represent them and to act
according to new patterns.
That’s why reflection plays an important function for the “autopoiesis”
of educational systems that can maintain themselves only through a con-
tinuous processes of renewal and transformation, which require a sistem-
atic and specific engagement of educational professionals. 
Finally, reflection sustains the creation of multiple spaces of encounter,
communication and discourse within which educational agents define
their personal and professional identities in a meaningful way, through the
double reference to themselves and to the others as well as to the systems
they are part of. 
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